

Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000400130003-3

**SECRET**

3 JUN 1965

The Honorable Dean Rusk  
Secretary of State  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Dean:

A thorough review of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] has shown the necessity for re-emphasizing certain basic security principles within the U. S. intelligence community. This is the most recent in a series of serious cases typifying the success of the opposition in penetrating the barriers of our community security systems. For we truly are a community, with all the strengths and weaknesses inherent therein. The necessary and beneficial community-wide dissemination of our finished intelligence product can be transformed into a security hazard when the security posture of any one member or component thereof permits penetration and exploitation by a hostile intelligence service.

No agency or department of the U. S. intelligence community is immune to the danger of penetration, and if any one member is effectively penetrated the entire U. S. intelligence effort -- a community effort -- may suffer irreparable damage. As Director of Central Intelligence, I am responsible for the protection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. In discharging that responsibility, I am requesting that each member of the U. S. intelligence community take the following action:

[REDACTED]

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

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An excellent example for use in such a security indoctrination program is found in the unclassified Department of Army Circular 380-1, dated 20 April 1966, entitled "Hostile Intelligence Exploitation of U. S. Army Personnel. "

In the development of supervisors at all levels, reaffirm the necessity for security responsibility and alertness by supervisors to behavior patterns of personnel which reflect personal problems susceptible to exploitation by a hostile intelligence service. This is not only common sense and good security, it is an integral part of efficient management. If this basic managerial tool is neglected, many of our other security efforts will be frustrated.

Review the scope and adequacy of background investigation and reinvestigation programs. Are all leads being followed? Are all reasonable doubts being resolved? Is quality as well as quantity being stressed? All members of the intelligence community are subjected to similar demands for productivity in the area of clearances, but the demands of national security must take precedence. If the quality of our background investigations and re-investigations is sacrificed to achieve quantity, whatever the rationalization for such a course may be, the real loser will be the national interest. In the very near future, the United States Intelligence Board intends to establish uniform personnel security criteria for access to compartmented intelligence information. This will establish minimum standards throughout the community for access to our most sensitive intelligence information. But these, and other criteria, will be meaningless unless they are adhered to in spirit as well as in the letter.

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The U. S. intelligence community has a unique responsibility to this nation. If our security programs and standards are not rigidly enforced, we shall be derelict in our obligations both to ourselves and to the country we serve. I am requesting, therefore, that each member department and agency realistically and on a priority basis examine its own security posture and take additional action as necessary in its Personnel Security and Counterintelligence Programs to prevent hostile penetration of the Intelligence Community. However impressive our substantive intelligence production may be, however sophisticated our means of collection, if we fail to ensure to the best of our ability the security of our information and our personnel, we fail in an essential part of our mission.

Your personal attention and assistance in this community security effort will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

(signed) W. F. Raborn

W. F. Raborn  
Director

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Identical Letters sent to:

The Secretary of Defense  
Chairman, JCS  
Chairman, AEC  
Director, FBI  
Secretary of the Army  
Secretary of the Navy  
Secretary of the Air Force

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